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Recent Decisions
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-Immigration Law-Relief from Deportation
Allowed Independent of Attorney General's Discretion-Errico v. Immi-
gration and Naturalization Serv., 349 F.2d 541 (9 th Cir. 1965).
Petitioner Errico, facing deportation, raised as his defense section 241(f)1 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which exempts from deportation aliens
who entered the United States by fraud if they have specified familial ties to persons
within the United States and are "otherwise admissible." The Board of Immingra-
tion Appeals ruled that, since petitioner gained admission as a selected imnmigrantg by
means of false affidavits, the denial of a discretionary waiver3 by the Attorney Gen-
eral precluded him from being "otherwise admissible."' On appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held, reversed; an alien with the requisite familial ties
is "otherwise admissible" and entitled to "absolute relief" under section 24 -(f) if his
fraud is the only ground for deportation.
Congress, beginning in 194o,5 authorized the Attorney General to grant an increas-
ing number of discretionary exemptions from deportation.6 In 1957, the Immigration
and Nationality Act 7 was amended to allow the Attorney General to admit at his dis-
cetion aliens who originally procured entry by fraud if they had specified familial
%. The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens within the United
States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as aliens who have
sought to procure, or have procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the
United States by fraud or misrepresentation shall not apply to an alien otherwise admissi-
ble at the time of entry who is the spouse, parent, or a child of a United States citizen or
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
75 Stat. 655 (i961), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1964).
2. 73 Stat. 644 (1959), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(I)(A) (1964).
3. 66 Stat. %8: (%952), 8 U.S.C. § ii8r(c) (1964).
4. Errico v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 349 F.2d 541, 544 (9 th Cir. %965).
5. 54 Stat. 67z .
6. Gordon, Due Process of Law in Immigration Proceedings, 5o A.B.AJ. 34, 39 (1964). See
also S. Rep. No. 1515, 8%st Cong., zd Sess. 596 (1950).
7. 66 Stat. z66 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §§ %ioi-5o3 (1964).
ties and were "otherwise admissible."'8 In 1961, the act was further amended,9 deleting
all reference to the Attorney General's discretion.
In Errico, the issue was whether section 241(f) automatically exempted a petitioner
from deportation upon a showing of the requisite familial ties or whether relief was
available only at the discretion of the Attorney General. This issue in turn was con-
trolled by construction of the term "otherwise admissible." The Immigration and
Naturalization Service contended that, since petitioner's fraud had made him inad-
missible under section 2c2,10 and since he was ineligible to enter under another quota,
a discretionary waiver by the Attorney General was his only means of becoming
"otherwise admissible" under section 241(f). 1 The court replied that this interpreta-
tion would limit the operation of section 24 1(f) to the incongruous case of an alien
who was "otherwise admissible" under a different quota, but who had chosen in-
stead to procure a visa by fraud. The court posited that section 241(f) must be read
together with section 212(a), which lists classes of aliens excludable by law; section
212(a) (19) excludes an alien who "seeks to enter the United States by fraud." Since
section 241(f) exempted aliens covered by section 212(a) (i9), the court reasoned
that an alien was "otherwise admissible" under section 241(f) as long as he was not
covered by any of the remaining classes. The amended statute therefore grants to
qualified aliens "absolute relief" independent of discretionary action by the Attorney
General. The other thirty-nine classes of excludable aliens listed in section 212(a) are
left unaffected by the court's interpretation. Subsection :E9 will still apply to an alien
who cannot qualify under section 241(f).
The importance of the decision lies in the consequences flowing from its definition
of "otherwise admissible." Prior to Errico, the only form of nondiscretionary relief
from deportation was a private act of Congress.12 By removing the Attorney General's
discretion from the operation of section 241(f), the court recognized a new type of
deportation relief-absolute relief. However, the decision leaves unanswered a funda-
mental question: What are the mechanics for qualifying for "absolute relief"?
The alien who raises section 241(f) as a defense to deportation is, in effect, assert-
ing that section as an absolute defense.' s Thus, his position is analogous to a peti-
tioner who claims citizenship as a defense because the deportation laws apply only to
aliens.14 A petitioner who raises the defense of citizenship has the burden of producing
substantial evidence of that citizenship in the administrative proceeding before he
may have his claim judicially reviewed.' 5 Thus, in Ng Fung Ho v. White,'0 where
petitioners were ordered deported for entering the country by fraud, the introduction
of third party testimony and reports of immigation officials was "sufficient, if be-
8. 71 Stat. 64o (1957). The only two cases construing the phrase "otherwise admissible"
under this statute are in conflict. Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642, 648 (ist Cir. 1961) ,
took the position of the court in Errico, whereas Buffalino v. Holland, 277 F.2d 270, 278-79
(3d Cir. 1960), accepted the argument of the Government.
9. 75 Stat. 655 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 125 1(f) (%964).
1o. 66 Stat. :82 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 182 (%964).
ii. Errico, 349 F.2d at 544, 546.
%2. Wasserman, Immigration Law and Practice 103-13 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Wasser-
man].
13. Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 4.7c(i) (196o) [hereinafter
cited as Gordon & Rosenfield].
14. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153 (1923).
15. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 34-35 (1939).
16. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
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lieved, to entitle them to a finding of citizenship," 17 and the petitioners were held to
have presented a reviewable claim.
By analogy, if the Government produces substantial evidence' 8 that petitioner is
subject to deportation' 9 because of fraud, its burden of proof for a favorable ruling
under section 22(a) (%9) is sustained.2" Continuing the analogy, the burden would
shift to the petitioner to come forth with evidence establishing his exemption from
deportation.2' To establish his exemption and raise a reviewable claim under section
241(f), the petitioner must produce substantial evidence that he has the requisite
familial ties. But requiring the same standard of proof for the second statutory criteria
for exemption-that is, requiring the alien to prove he is "otherwise admissible"22
because he is not excluded under any of the forty different grounds enumerated in
section 212(a)-Would impose on the petitioner an intolerable burden. Further, one
of the basic concepts of Anglo-American law is a presumption of innocence for the
accused in criminal proceedings.23 Although the Supreme Court has consistently held
that deportation proceedings are not criminal in nature, 24 it has also recognized that
deportation is a severe penalty,2 5 indicating that deportation proceedings may require
commensurate safeguards. These safeguards should require, at a minimum, the crim-
inal law practice of placing upon the Government the burden of providing the alien
not "otherwise admissible."26 This suggested analysis may follow from Errico:
neither side introduced evidence bearing on whether or not petitioner was includable
in any of the other classes in section 212(a), yet the court found him "otherwise ad-
missible." -2 7
Had the court sustained the Government's position, a claim for relief raised under
section 24 1(f) would have been granted only at the Attorney General's discretion28
in a separate proceeding; and that discretion can be judicially overruled only when
17. Id. at 282.
%8. McNeil v. Kennedy, 298 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. %962).
19. Palmer v. Ultimo, 69 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1934).
20. United States ex rel. Bishop v. Watkins, %59 F.2d 505, 506 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 839 (1947).
21. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2487 (3 d ed. 1940). Gordon & Rosenfleld § 5iob.
22. See note i supra.
23. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 251% (3 d ed. 1940).
24. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952).
25. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 1o (%948).
26. Cf. Sherman v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Civil No. 29487, 2d Cir., Sept.
22, %965, where the government in proceedings to deport long-term resident aliens was re-
quired to bear a heavier burden of proof than normally prevails in civil proceedings.
27. Errico, 349 F.2d at 544, 546.
28. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354, 357 (%956). In United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaugh-
nessy, 18o F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1950), where a discretionary suspension of deportation was denied
solely on the basis of the deportee's membership in the International Workers Order when
there was no evidence that the Order was in any way inimical to the interests of the United
States and the deportee had severed all connections with the Order, the court speaking through
Learned Hand said, "we cannot tell whether the Attorney General had adequate grounds for
'proscribing' [the Order]. On the other hand, we cannot say that he did not.... [Unless the
ground stated is on its face insufficient, [the deportee] must accept the decision, for it was
made in the 'exercise of discretion' which we have again and again declared that we will not
review." Id. at 49o.
exercised arbitrarily.29Errico makes a section 2 4 1(f) daim for relief a part of the non-
discretionary deportation proceedings,30 and an alien may have an adverse adminis-
trative decision judicially reviewed for compliance with the burden of proof and oth-
er due process requirements applicable to such proceedings.3 1
I. Clifton Fleming, Jr.
ADMIRALTY-Maritime Lien-Materialman's Duty of Inquiry Required of
Shipper-United States v. The S. S. Lucie Schulte, 343 F.2d 897 (2d
Cir. c965).
The S. S. Lucre ScurTE was time chartered 1 from her German owners by a cor-
poration operating in Florida. The United States, as a party to a contract of affreight-
ment2 with the charterer, was overcharged3 for shipments aboard the vessel. The gov-
ernment libelled the ship in rem, daiming a maritime lien for the amount overpaid.
The owners, appearing for the ship, argued that there could be no liability in rem be-
cause the charter party contained a "prohibition of lien" dause4 that denied the
charterer authority to bind the vessel to liens. The district court,5 rejecting this de-
fense, recognized that the clause would affect materialmen's statutory liens,6 where
a reasonably diligent inquiry has always been required,7 but held that it could have
no effect on shippers' common law liens for carriage of goods.8 The Court of Appeals
29. Schieber v. Imnigration and Naturalization Serv., 347 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. x965).
30. See Gordon & Rosenfield § 4.7c.
31. Id. at §§ 8.5 and 8.gAh(%); Wasserman 13o-32b.
%. Under a time charter and a voyage charter the owner mans the vessel. The charterer
mans the vessel when she is demise (bareboat) chartered.
2. A contract of affreightment is a contract for the shipment of goods or passengers. A
shipper is the party possessing goods and contracting for their shipment. An owner is a per-
son who has legal title to a ship. A furnisher is a materialman, supplier, or repairman. Un-
fortunately, writers often use the broad term "shipping industry" when actually referring to
particular components of the industry. The industry breaks down into two major relation-
ships: owner interests vis-h-vis furnisher interests, and owner interests vis-a-vis shipping
interests. The two are materially different, and it should be remembered that, although
Schulte concerns the latter, the term "shipping industry" used in maritime lien law most often
denotes the former.
3. Neither party to the contract was aware of the overcharge when it occurred. Lack of
knowledge of the overcharge is no longer a bar to subsequent action. Krauss Bros. Lumber
Co. v. Dimon S.S. Corp., 290 U.S. 117 (1933).
4. "Charterers will not suffer, nor permit to be continued, any lien or encumbrance in-
curred by them or their agents, which might have priority over the title and interest of the
owners in the vessel." 343 F.zd at 898.
5. United States v. The S.S. Lucie Schulte, 227 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
6. Merchant Marine Act § 30, 41 Stat. oo5 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 971-75 (1964).
7- United States v. Carver, 26o U.S. 482, 489 (1923).
8. The initial version of the Maritime Lien Act was construed to apply only to claims con-
ceming "outfitting." Claims involved with the "carriage of freight" were considered to be in
the realm of general maritime law. The Muskegon, 275 Fed. 1%7 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). Congress,
being dissatisfied with this narrow interpretation, based on the rule of ejusdem generis,
amended the act to give it broader coverage. 36 Stat. 6o4 (191o), reenacted with amendments
in the Merchant Marine Act § 30, 41 Stat. 005 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 0 971-75 (1964); Gilmore
& Black, The Law of Admiralty 542 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore & Black]. See The
Artemis, 53 F.zd 672 (S.D.N.Y. %931) (lien allowed for taxi fare); The Henry S. Grove, 285
Fed. 6o (W.D. Wash. 1922) (stevedoring services as "outfitting"). However, a distinction be-
tween the two types of liens still exists, as the act does not cover all liens recognized by
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for the Second Circuit held, reversed; a shipper is barred from asserting a maritime lien
where a reasonably diligent inquiry would have disclosed the charterer's lack of au-
thority to bind the vessel to liens.9
The Admiralty proceeding in rem has its foundation in the maritime lien,10 enforce-
able only through legal process." In practical effect, this personification of ships'12 is
more fiction than fact, for any liability of the vessel rests ultimately with the owner;
he must either satisfy the liability or suffer the ship to be attached and sold. The re-
sulting liability, both in rem and in personam,'5 is extensive and, in conjunction with
the high risks of commerce at sea,14 has resulted in methods allowing owners to limit
their liability.15 However, providing adequate remedies for persons injured through
general maritime law. % Benedict, Admiralty 269 (6th ed. 1940). The statements of the district
court imply a belief that general maritime liens, recognized by the courts and free from
statutory control, are unalterable through private contracts.
9. Heretofore, the distinction between liens that could or could not be prevented by a pro-
hibition of lien clause has turned mainly on whether the lien was voluntary or involuntary.
A voluntary lien arose as the result of an implied consensual pledge of the vessel for mari-
time services and supplies. Involuntary meant "nonconsensual," i.e., a lien arising by opera-
tion of law. The court in Schulte cast this distinction in terms of "tort liens" and "contract
liens." This has been construed to mean that a prohibition of lien clause will prevent a
charterer from binding the vessel to any liens except (a) those resulting from torts (e.g., col-
lision, personal injury), and (b) those resulting from statutory liability imposed on the vessel
(e.g., cargo damage caused by unseaworthiness when the bills of lading are subject to the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 Stat. 1207 (7936), 46 U.S.C. § i3oo-i5 (1964). The decision
allows the clause to prevent any lien for breach of contract provided the claimant had actual
or constructive knowledge of the clause. Letter from Healy & Baillie to Thos. R. Miller & Son,
August 6, 1965.
%o. In Osaka Shosen Kaisha v. Pacific Export Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 490, 497 (1923), the
Supreme Court called the proceeding a "peculiarity" of admiralty law. In light of modern
suits directed against the res, the Court must have been thinking historically. A maritime lien
is an appropriation of the ship for a debt or claim. It is given by the law, and it gives
the creditor a special property in the ship, which subsists from the moment the debt
arises, and it gives him a right to have the vessel sold that his debt may be paid out of
the proceeds....
The Poznan, 9 F.2d 838, 842 (2d Cir. %925).
Maritime liens have been plagued with terminology problems through their confusion
with common law dry land liens. The two have few similarities. Maritime liens are of the
charging type-not based on possession-and obtain priority in inverse order of their cre-
ation. They may be lost through laches or by "execution" issued by a foreign court without
notice. Gilmore & Black 480-83.
=I. Insurance Co. v. Gossler, 96 U.S. 645, 654 (1878).
12. American theory on the personality of the ship treats the vessel as the offending thing.
English theory is founded upon procedural arrest which compels the owner's appearance. For
a general discussion, see Herbert, The Origin and Nature of Maritime Liens, 4 Tul. L. Rev. 381
(-1930).
13. In all suits for supplies, repairs, or other necessaries, the libellant may proceed against
the ship and freight in rem or against the master and owner in personam. The Lottawanna,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 579-81 (%875).
%4. Damages often exceed the value of the vessel. See The Julia Luckenbach, 235 Fed. 388
(2d Cir. 19%6). The owner's position is worsened by his inability to exercise any degree of
control over his "servants" once the ship has left port. Gilmore & Black 696.
%5. American courts have always limited the owner's liability in rem to the value of the
ship. He is held liable in personam beyond the value of the ship if he is personally at fault.
However, he has the statutory right to limit his liability. Poor, A Shipowner's Right to Limit
Liability in Cases of Personal Contracts, 31 Yale L.J. 505, 505-06 (1922). See Gilmore & Black
663-748.
maritime tort or contract continues to pose a problem. The complex history of mari-
time liens is essentially the story of this conflict of interests.16
The question of liability is more difficult to resolve when the ship is under the con-
trol of charterers who would be considered independent contractors at common law.'7
A large body of law developed around this problem as it affected materialmen. The
decision in Schulte applied the requirements of materialmen's liens to shippers.
Materialmen (suppliers of goods, repairs, and other necessaries) have long had an
affirmative duty to question the authority of charterers to bind a vessel to liens.18
Consequently, the materialman has been charged with knowledge of the terms of the
charter party if, through a reasonably diligent inquiry, he could have ascertained
them.19 Reliance upon the representations of the person in possession of the ship that
he is the owner, where investigation would have revealed him to be a charterer, will
not suffice.20 Failure to investigate, however, will not bar action if the inquiry would
have revealed that the charterer actually had the necessary authority,2 ' or if the in-
quiry would not have revealed that the charterer lacked the necessary authority 2
The Maritime Lien Acts of 191o and E92023 codified this duty of inquiry, state leg-
islation conflicting with this statute has subsequently fallen into disuse.24 Courts have
been concerned primarily with determining the effects on the vessel's liability of par-
ticular words used in charter dauses25 intended to limit liability, and of the true in-
16. See Gilmore & Black 48o-568.
17. Price, Whether Maritime Lien Can Arise Independently of Owner's Liability-Demise
Charterer Deemed an Owner, 33 Can. B. Rev. 190, 1=91 (1955).
%8. The requirement first appeared in The Kate, 164 U.S. 458 (1896), and The Valencia,
%65 U.S. 264 (1897). The rule making the duty affirmative and not contingent on circum-
stances putting the would-be lienor on notice was laid down in United States v. Carver, 26o
U.S. 482, 489 (1923).
19. The Dictator, %8 F.2d 131 (E.D. La. 1927).
2o. P. H. Gill & Sons Forge & Mach. Works v. United States, % F.2d 964 (4 th Cir. 1924).
21. The Golden Gate, 52 F.2d 3 9 7 (9th Cir. %931).
22. The Hurricane, 2 F.zd 70 (E.D. Pa. 1924), aff'd, 9 F.2d 396 (3 d Cir. %925); Esso Export
Corp. v. The Cortes, 136 F. Supp. 5o6 (S.D. Ala. 1955).
23. Merchant Marine Act § 30, 36 Stat. 604 (19io), as amended by 41 Stat. 1005 (1920),
46 U.S.C. §§ 971-75 (1964). For a detailed discussion of the acts, see Smith, The New Federal
Statute Relating to Liens on Vessels, 24 Harv. L. Rev. %82 (19=1); Griffin, The Federal Mari-
time Lien Act, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 15 (1923). For a judicial discussion of the effects of the acts,
see W. A. Marshall & Co. v. The S.S. "President Arthur," 279 U.S. 564 (1929); Piedmont &
Georges Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U.S. % (1920).
24. Gilmore & Black 544-45. No lien was given by the general maritime law for supplies
and repairs furnished in her home port unless such a lien was recognized by local state law.
The General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438, 443 (%819) (dictum); accord, The Planter, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 324 (1833) (General Smith dictum converted to holding). For a discussion of the effects
of these decisions, see Smith, The Confusion in the Law of Materialmen's Liens on Vessels, 21
Harv. L. Rev. 332 (19o8). For the purpose of the home-port doctrine, the states were con-
sidered foreign to each other. The Golden Rod, 151 Fed. 6 (2d Cir. 1907). In deference to their
local materialmen, each state filled the gap left by The General Smith, supra, by passing the
necessary local statutes. Gilmore & Black 53o. The liens they created were still enforceable
only in federal courts. The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U.S. 1 (1893).
25. Clause requiring the charterer "to provide and pay for the upkeep of the vessel...."
Sustaining a lien: The Golden Gate, 52 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 682
(1932). Denying a lien: The Thordis, 290 Fed. 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1923). Where the charterer could
not "suffer nor permit to be continued any lien," a lien has been specifically denied. United
States v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 13 F.2d 8o8, 809 (ist Cir. %926). A lien was allowed
when a clause read: "the charterer will save the owner harmless from liens.. . ." The South
Coast, 251 U.S. 519 (1920). Consequently, a lower court interpreted "the charterer shall pay
for all supplies" as granting authority to invoke a lien. The Luddco, 66 F.2d 997 (9 th Cir.
1933). Some have distinguished The South Coast, supra, and denied a lien. Curacao Trading
Co. v. Bjorge, 263 Fed. 693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 492 (1920). The Supreme Court, in
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tent of the parties evidenced by particular practices used in the course of their busi-
ness.20
Section 972 of the act lists the persons "presumed to have authority"27 to bind the
vessel to liens: "managing owner, ship's husband, master, or any person to whom
management of the vessel at the port of supply is intrusted."28 Section 973 provides
that "officers and agents of a vessel specified in section 972 ... shall be taken to in-
dude such officers and agents when appointed by a charterer .... -29 The last part of
section 973, that which most directly affects charterers, has been given overriding
emphasis by the courts:
but nothing in this chapter shall be construed to confer a lien when the fur-
nisher knew, or by exercise of reasonable diligence could have ascertained,
that because of the terms of a charter party' ... the person ordering the re-
pairs, supplies, or other necessaries was without authority to bind the vessel
therefor 30
The act was hailed as being in line with "modem shipping" practices because on
the "larger lines the master now has very little to do with the furnishings of the ves-
sel ... this duty being attended to by an agent on shore .... "s The owner, of course,
wanted to deny all others power to bind the ship; the latter part of section 973 afforded
this opportunity. Materialmen were assisted by the requirement of The Valencia3 2
that circumstances put the materialman on notice of such a denial of authority. This
delicate balance of protections was tipped overwhelmingly in favor of the owners
when the Supreme Court discarded the notice requirement of The Valencia without
citation of authority in United States v. Carver.3
It has been urged that the section 972 term "person... intrusted"3 4 be interpreted
to mean person "intrusted by the owner as his agent."35 This narrow approach sup-
posedly would protect the materialman when dealing with the "owner's man," but
would place him under a duty of inquiry when dealing with others, such as char-
terers.3 6 This reasoning would appear sound if the materialman could rely on the state-
ments of the person in possession of the vessel or other "owner's man" that he is the
owner's agent; but the P. H. Gill & Sons Forge & Mach. Works v. United Statess de-
its most recent effort to resolve the issue, allowed a lien when the charterer was to "provide
and pay for.. . ." Dampskibsselskabet Dannebrog v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 31o U.S. 268
(1940).
26. Gilmore & Black 55o.
27. Merchant Marine Act § 30, 41 Stat. 1oo5 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 972 (1964).
28. Ibid.
29. 41 Stat. oo5 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 973 (:964). [Emphasis added.]
30. 4% Stat. oo5 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 973 (%964).
31. Smith, The New Federal Statute Relating to Liens on Vessels, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 182, 191
(1911).
32. 165 U.S. 264 (1897).
33- 260 U.S. 482 (1923).
34. 4% Stat. 1005 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 972 (%964).
35. Gilmore & Black 555.
36. Ibid.
37. % F.2d 964 (4 th Cir. 1924).
cision says that he cannot do so. He must make further inquiry at all times to con-
firm these statements.
A broad interpretation of the act, such as that suggested in Dampskibsselskabet
Dannebrog v. Signal Oil & Gas Co.,38 would allow the statutory presumption of au-
thority always to be controlled by a contractual "provision to the contrary."8 9 This
eliminates any advantage materialmen might have gained through the act by allow-
ing section 973 to cancel section 972.40
It appears that either a broad or narrow interpretation of the act affords the ma-
terialman no relief. He must always inquire; if he discovers a prohibition of lien
clause, he cannot hold the vessel liable in rem. At present nothing prevents an owner
from circumventing liability in rem by chartering all his ships to a puppet company
which, of course, would not have lien-binding authority.41 This possibility hardly
could have been the result intended by Congress.
4 2
The conclusion that the act is ambiguous or self-contradictory can be avoided by
reading the act in its logical sequence and by adopting a theory somewhere between
these extremes. Thus, the "presumption of authority" would control persons having
possession or control over the vessel in the port of supply; "provisions to the con-
trary" would control all others. This would be reasonable, at least with respect to
time charters, since those responsible, with the exception of the charterer himself, are
the original employees of the owner who are entrusted with possession of the vessel
for purposes of tort liability and should be presumed to have his trust to contract for
the vessel. This would not necessarily defy modem shipping practices because large
lines maintaining local agents could make this fact known to materialmen as allowed
in section 973. This restriction affecting larger lines, as distinguished from restric-
tions imposed in charter parties, does not deny everyone authority to bind the vessel.
Problems seem to arise only when complete denial is attempted.
The Lien Act has rarely been mentioned with reference to contracts of affreight-
ment,43 such as the one in Schulte. But the court in Schulte, justifying its extension
of the act, said that "we perceive no tenable ground for narrowing the broad lan-
guage [of the act] to materialmen's liens." 44 This statement not only refutes the in-
tention of Congress,45 but also disagrees with leading authority on the subject.46 A
narrow application of the act seems to follow logically from analysis of the act itself
47
and of the intention of Congress. 48 Accordingly, the act generally has been construed
as controlling only those liens to which it refers.
49
38. 310 U.S. 268 (194o).
39. Id. at 280.
4o. Gilmore & Black 557. However, Signal Oil has been confined to its particular facts.
Gilmore & Black, supra. Signal Oil, upholding a lien, would appear to be a materialman's
victory, but, in fact, was not. It firmly avowed Justice Holmes' view that materialmen were
always charged with knowledge of the contents of a charter. United States v. Carver, 260
U.S. 482 (1923); Gilmore & Black 566.
4-1. Price, supra note 17, at 191i.
42. Piedmont & Georges Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U.S. 1E, 11-12 (1920).
43. Gilmore & Black 544.
44. 343 F.2d at 9o.
45. Piedmont & Georges Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U.S. 1,111-12 (1920).
46. Robinson, Admiralty 373-76 (1c939); 1 Benedict, Admiralty 267-81 (6th ed. 1940);
Gilmore & Black 539-68.
47. See authorities cited at note 46 supra. For instance, the act fails to mention shippers
by name. Such a reference would have been simple had Congress intended the act to apply
to them.
48. Piedmont & Georges Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U.S. 1, 11%-12 (1920).
49. Griffin, The Federal Maritime Lien Act, 37 Harv. L. Rev. x5, 18 (1924); Atlantic
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The inapplicability of the act to the shipper's situation can also be shown upon
analysis of the fundamental differences between the shipping and supply industries.50
The shipper, dealing individually or through brokerage firms far in advance of the
arrival of the vessel, often bargains over great distances by telephone, wireless, or
cable.51 He is denied easy access to information about the vessel's circumstances be-
fore or even after the contract is made since he is not always present when ship and
cargo are joined.52 The supplier's position is different. He not only is bound by tradi-
tional rules to question the circumstances of those to whom he extends credit,5 3 but
also is located in the port and probably near the piers where he furnishes his services.
His opportunities to board the vessel to investigate the charterer's authority far ex-
ceed those of the shipper. 4
The possibility is apparent that the decision in Schulte could unduly burden the
shipping industry. Had the court carefully investigated this possibility and then de-
cided that the burden would be tolerable, the decision would have been on safer
grounds. Instead, the court summarily dismissed the issue by saying that "this goes
to the factual question of what diligence reasonable under the circumstances would
have disclosed. . . ."5 This statement threatens a multitude of judicial definitions of
"reasonable diligence" and other requirements to be met; 56 it forces the shipper either
to conduct a pervasive inquiry or to risk litigation based on his failure to be reason-
ably diligent.
An attractive alternative to the problem of charterers binding a vessel to liens is
offered by The Ripon City.57 Under this decision the owner's transfer of possession of
the vessel is considered voluntary.58 He has the opportunity to demand details about
the financial and business responsibility of the transferee. This would bring to life
the principle of The China:5 9 making the vessel a pledge to all with whom its lawful
possessor deals. 0 In support of the pledge theory, it could be argued that contracts for
Steamer Supply Co. v. The Tradewind, %44 F. Supp. 4o8 (D. Md. 1956) (notice provisions held
not to apply to mortgages).
50. For an excellent background see Dover, The Shipping Industry, Its Constitution and
Practices (195z); Rosenthal, Techniques of International Trade (950). "Shipping" is used in
the narrow sense. See note 2 supra.
51. Kendall, Tramp Shipping, Polaris 37 (Summer m952).
52. The situation becomes more difficult for the shipper when he removes himself further
from contact with the vessel by using "freight forwarders." See Horn & Gomez, International
Trade, Principles and Practices, 519-2% (4th ed. 1959); McDowell & Gibbs, Ocean Transpor-
tation %45-55 (1954).
53. There is no question of credit in the cargo to ship relationship. Gilmore & Black 544.
54. It could also be argued that the owner could require, and realistically expect, the
charterer to pay suppliers in cash, thereby avoiding any liability for which the ship might be
attached as security. This is not true for a shipper. The contract of affreightment involves
liabilities which cannot be immediately discharged by cash payment, but only by the ship's
performance. Brief for Appellee, p. %4, United States v. The S.S. Lucie Schulte, 343 F.2d 897
(2d Cir. 1965).
55. 343 F.2d at 901.
56. This was the result with materialmen's liens. Gilmore & Black 546.
57. [1897] P. 226, 244.
58. Price, supra note 17, at %191.
59. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (r868).
6o. Robinson, Admiralty 364 (1939).
supply and repair are for the benefit of the ship in that they speed her on her way.
Contracts of affreightment make her existence profitable to her owner and therefore
make her existence possible. To induce materialmen and shippers to confer these bene-
fits on her, the vessel pledges herself as security for performance. 0 '
The court in Schulte paid lip service to this theory by first acknowledging it:
[It is] a just and reasonable implication of law that the general owner assents
to the creation of liens binding upon his interest in the vessel, as security for
the performance of contracts of affreightment made in the course of the law-
ful employment of the vessel, 62
and then dismantling it by observing it was limited to parties without notice of any
restriction upon the apparent authority.63 If the court in Schulte had accepted this
doctrine, without the restriction, the shipping industry would have been relieved of
the burden of making a difficult inquiry. Materialmen would be ensured their much
debated yet virtually nonexistent "presumption of authority." 4 The question of
whether or not the initial scope of the act included shippers becomes moot; they would
be safe when dealing with persons having legal possession or control of the ship. The
owner's inability to prevent in rem liability with a simple contractual dause should
generally improve the responsibility of charterers and reduce the number of insolven-
cies and breaches of duty in tort or contract.
These considerations indicate that the decision in Schulte is an improper extension
of a misinterpreted act.
James N. Penrod
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-Capital Gain Treatment Afforded Proceeds
of Sale in a Charitable Sale and Leaseback-Commissioner v. Brown, 38o
U.S. 563 (1965).
In 1953, the taxpayer and other members of his family transferred to the California
Cancer Institute, a non-profit, tax-exempt organization, all their stock in Brown and
Co., a lumber mill. The purchase price was $i,3oo,ooo, payable $5,000 in cash, and
promissory notes for the remainder to be paid solely from the proceeds of operating
the mill; also included was a default dause should less than $25o,ooo be paid in any
two year period in the ten years allowed for payment. With the transfer of stock,
Institute liquidated the company and leased its assets for five years to a new corpo-
ration, Fortuna Sawmills, Inc., formed and wholly owned by the attorneys for the
sellers. Fortuna agreed to pay Institute eighty per cent of its profits from operations
without allowance for depreciation or taxes; ninety per cent of such payments would
be paid by Institute to the selling stockholders to apply on the promissory note. If
6%. Although the concept of mutuality was dismissed by the court in Schulte, it does not
seem patently just that the owner, under certain circumstances, can assert a lien for under-
payment of freight, In re North Atl. & Gulf S.S. Co., 2o4 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd
sub noma. Schilling v. A/S D/S Dannebrog, 32o F.zd 6z8 (zd Cir. 1963), while the shipper can-
not assert one for overpayment.
62. 343 F.2d at 900, quoting from Hickox v. Buckingham (The Schooner Freeman), 59 U.S.
(%8 How.) %82, 19o (1856).
63. Ibid.
64. 4-1 Stat. oo5 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 972 (x964).
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any of these agreements were violated, the stockholders had the right to foreclose
on the business assets securing the note. Taxpayer retained a salaried position as
general manager with the right to appoint his successor; he also continued to be
personally liable for some of the indebtedness incurred by Fortuna. The Commissioner
disallowed capital gains treatment of the proceeds to taxpayer from the Institute,
arguing that the entire transaction was a sham designed to avoid payment of ordinary
income tax. The Tax Court found to the contrary,1 holding that there had been a
bona-fide arms-length bargaining for the sale at a reasonable price. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.2 On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the
Commissioner shifted his argument, stressing that, without shifting the business
risks from the seller to the purchaser, the transaction was not a sale under the
capital gains provision of the Code.3 The Supreme Court held, affirmed; the term
sale, as used in the capital gains provisions, has only its ordinary meaning, not a
narrow tax construction requiring a shifting of economic risks from seller to pur-
chaser in a sale and leaseback.
Brown is representative of a number of cases in which the Commissioner has sought
to check apparent abuses of the exempt status of charitable institution's income in
cases of a "boot-strap" sale and leaseback.4 Abuses of the tax exempt status of chari-
ties5 prompted Congress to reform the Code in 195o by addition of sections now con-
tained in the 1954 Code as sections 511, 512, 513, and 514; these sections tax income
of an otherwise exempt institution when it operates an "unrelated trade or business."6
%. Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461 (196%).
2. 325 F.2d 3%3 (9 th Cir. 1963).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1222(3) [sections of the 1954 Code will hereinafter be cited by
section number only].
4. Brown, 380 U.S. at 566 n. 3.
5. Generally, three advantages could be derived through the sale, or sale and leaseback,
to an exempt institution. Since exempt institutions paid no taxes on their income, they often
could afford to pay a higher purchase price than an ordinary businessman. See MacCracken,
Selling a Business to a Charitable Foundation, U. So. Cal. 1954 Tax Inst. 205; Comment, The
Three-Party Sale and Lease-Back, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 114o (1963); i9 J. Taxation 302 (1963).
To insulate the exempt institution from loss, the purchaser would pay the purchase price in-
stallments only from the proceeds of the business. A second advantage was available through
the sale and leaseback transaction, in which the seller sold part of the corporation's assets to
the exempt institution at a favorable price and then leased back the assets, deducting the
rental payments from the gross income of his business. He recovered his rental payments as
the exempt institution liquidated the purchase price. The seller thereby reduced his corporate
tax liability to the extent of the rental payments; in turn, those rental payments were funneled
back to him and taxed at capital gains rates on the excess of the purchase price over basis.
In a third possible factual situation, the seller, in a year in which his income was subject to
heavy taxation, could transfer the business assets at a loss deductible from his gross income.
6. The %950 Code additions amended § 1o of the 1939 Code and added §§ 421-24, 3813,
3814. These amendments are now §§ 501-14. The problems and abuses these sections were
intended to alleviate are fully discussed in Hearings on H.R. 9820 Before the Senate Finance
Committee on Ways and Means, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 374, 495, 498, 525, 534, 542, 550, 567,
589, 656, 664, 8W8, 846 (1950). Section 511 imposes the tax rates of § %% on the "unrelated
business taxable income" derived "by any organization from any unrelated trade or business,"
which is, by § 513, any trade or business "the conduct of which is not substantially related
(aside from the need of such organization for income or funds or the use it makes of the
profits derived) to the exercise or performance by such organization of its ... function(s)
An exception contained in section 514 (b), however, permits a realization of all pre-
vious tax advantages in selling a business to a charity. Rental income from real prop-
erty and personal property rented with the real is exempt from the unrelated business
income tax, providing it is realized from a lease of less than five years.7 Once the
obstacle of establishing a sale to the charity was hurdled, the fact pattern in Brown, a
test case,8 qualified for this five-year lease exception.
The Commissioner in Brown argued for a construction of the word "sale" that
would require a shifting of the economic risks from seller to purchaser before the sale
could be recognized for capital gains purposes.9 The Institute had assumed no im-
constituting the basis for its exemption under section 501 ...." Section 5oz is also important
in that it removes exempt status of income earned by a corporation operated solely for the
benefit of a charitable institution. Prior to r95o reforms, the exempt status of the charitable
institution was "imputed" to the corporation operating for the institution's benefit, under the
doctrines of Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924), and Roche's
Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938). Such imputation is now prohibited
by § 502.
The significance of this section is that the denial of exempt status to the "feeder" corpora-
tion forces the charitable institution either to operate the business itself, a disadvantage to
the charity since its assets are exposed to business losses, or to operate the business through a
dummy corporation, which activity might prove risky from the tax point of view. It could
reasonably be argued that the corporations like Fortuna, notwithstanding their ownership by
shareholders other than the exempt institution, are, in fact, "feeder" corporations operated
for the benefit of the exempt institution by virtue of the high percentage of their profits being
paid over as "rent" (8o% in Brown). If so, their income would be subject to tax by the pro-
visions of § 502. However, such an approach requires, in addition to an examination of the
status of dummy corporation, a concurrent examination of the nature of the "rent" discussed
in note 9 infra. Since taxation of any of the three entities (the seller, the exempt institution,
or dummy corporation, such as Fortuna) will obviate the attractiveness of the charitable sale
and leaseback, the Commissioner could still defeat the continued abuse of the exempt income
status through the use of existing provisions of the Code without need for continued or addi-
tional legislation.
A valuable exception to the provisions taxing unrelated business income is found in the
case of churches, or associations of churches, to which these provisions do not apply by
specific exclusion. Section 511 (a) (2) (A) provides that the tax on unrelated taxable income
shall "apply in the case of any organization (other than a church or a convention of churches
...)." Thus, a businessman may still sell his business directly to a church, which may operate
it, but not through a "feeder" corporation. This proposition might not be attractive to
the church, for by operating the business, it would become liable for operating losses the
business might incur. The church, however, can still carry the transaction, as can its fellow
tax exempt institutions, through the loophole discussed above.
7. Section 512 (b)(3) excludes from the definition of "unrelated business taxable income"
income derived from the rental of real property and personal property rented with the real.
If the rental income is used to reduce indebtedness incurred in the acquisition of the rental
property, as in Brown, it is included by § 514 (a) (i) as an item of "unrelated business taxable
income." However, subsection (b) provides that the rental income of a lease not exceeding five
years with the same lessee is not subject to § 514 inclusion. It should be noted that the rules
set out in § 514 (b)(2)(A)-(B) treat as a lease in excess of five years any lease with a renew-
able option that might extend the lease for more than five years, or any lease renewed by the
same tenant for more than the permissible five year period.
8. Brown, 38o U.S. at 584.
9. Most of the bootstrap cases, except Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37 (1956), aff'd, 254
F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958) frame the issue as "sale" or "no sale." In Kolkey, the court held that
the purchase price was unreasonable. In Brown, the line of attack might have pursued the
reasonableness of the rental deductions claimed by Fortuna under the doctrine that "ordinary
and necessary" expenses of § :62(3) are, in addition to these prerequisites, required to be
"reasonable" in amount, Limericks, Inc. v. Commissioner, %65 F.zd 483 (sth Cir. 1948). If
these deductions are disallowed as unreasonable the attractiveness of the sale and leaseback is
substantially reduced. In the attacks directed at the rental deductions the courts have not yet
considered the reasonable aspect of the rents, but only whether what was termed rent was,
as a matter of law, rent, rather than payment for some other purpose. See Anderson Dairy,
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mediate or future liability under the sales contract, and taxpayer's economic position
remained unchanged by the contract since his receipt of payments on the purchase
price depended entirely on the continued success of the business. Since the economic
position of both parties remained unchanged, no "sale" could have occurred.
Change in economic position is one of three factors generally considered in de-
termining whether a sale exists for tax purposes.1 0 The other two are transfer of legal
title and shift of legal and actual control from seller to purchaser of the sold assets and
income derived from them.11 Since legal title passed in Brown, only the other two
factors need consideration.
Authority exists for the other two considerations in analogous situations. For
example, capital loss deductions have been disallowed where taxpayers who sold
assets to controlled corporations were found to have suffered no economic detriment
through the transaction 12 since control of the assets remained with the sellers.13 In a
sale and immediate leaseback for ninety-nine years, the entire transaction was deemed
to have created only a mortgage; 14 where the leaseback was for more than thirty
years, capital loss was disallowed and the transaction deemed an exchange of property
for like kind upon which no capital loss or gain could be realized.Y5
All these cases lacked risk-shifting; but that element alone was not determinative
of the result. More important was the retention of control or use or both of the sold
assets. Although the taxpayer retained control over the sold assets and income in
Brown, the Commissioner did not stress these elements as an independent line of
attack; rather the control and use were argued to indicate an absence of risk-shifting.
The oil cases' 6 relied upon by the Commissioner in Brown offer apparent authority
Inc., 39 T.C. 1027 (%963) where the rent was held fully deductible relying on the doctrine set
forth in Stanley Imerman, 7 T.C. %o3o (1946). Cf. Royal Farms Dairy Co., 40 T.C. 17z (1963)
where the rent was reduced from 90% to 50% on the grounds that the parties (lessor and
lessee) intended the rental payments to enable the charitable foundation to pay off its in-
debtedness, relying principally upon the fact that at the end of the payments on indebtedness
the rent would be reduced from 90% to 6o%.
This line of attack would be less desirable from the revenue gathering standpoint than one
based upon the "feeder" theory suggested in note 6 supra, since this method would gain
revenues only from that part of the rent found to be "unreasonable," rather than from all the
rent regarded as payments of income by a "feeder" corporation.
The Internal Revenue Service has indicated its intention in a recent release to continue
attacking the sale and leaseback on the grounds of the reasonableness of the purchase price.
"The Revenue Service stated that, in its view, the Clay Brown decision does not extend to
cases where the amount payable to the sellers for their stock is in excess of the fair market
value of the stock." Litigation in this area will continue as rapidly as possible. Internal
Revenue Service, Technical Information Release, TIR 768, Oct. 5, 1965. This is essentially
the Kolkey basis of attack.
2o. Cf. Moore & Dohan, Sales, Churches, and Monkeyshines, 11 Tax L. Rev. 87, 92 (1956).
Yi. Ibid.
22. E.g., Schoenberg v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 2935); Chicago Title & Trust
Co., 32 B.T.A. 249 (2935).
13. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
24. Commissioner v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (2939).
15. See Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 4 53 (2d Cir. %959); Century Elec. Co.
v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. %951); and Standard Envelope Mfg. Co., 25 T.C. 42
(1950).
%6. Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946); Kirby Petroleum Co. v.
for his construction. There the courts examined the basic entrepreneurial attributes
of economic risk to determine whether the tax label of sale should be attached. That
a particular transaction is called a sale by the parties or under state law is irrelevant.
In these cases and in the Court's discussion of them in Brown, however, the nature of
the assets sold was deemed more important than the extent of risk-shifting under the
transfer.1 7 The process of oil extraction was viewed as a production process; the item
of production was oil and the income from its sale ordinary, rather than capital gain
from the conversion of a capital asset.
Since the Commissioner pitched his arguments solely on a construction of the word
sale that would require a shifting of risks, the Court dealt only with that narrow
issue. It concluded that a sale is a common transaction with an ordinary, everyday
meaning well understood to be the transfer of property for a consideration paid or
promised to be paid.' 8
An alternative approach, ignored by the Court, is to determine whether the transfer
shifts the incidence of taxation on the income of the mill from the taxpayer to the
Institute. The third element considered in questioning a tax sale-retained control over
the assets and income-becomes paramount here, for it is the control of income and
its sources that determines the party to be taxed on the income.' 9 The classic authority
on the effect of retained control is Helvering v. Clifford,20 in which the Court con-
cluded that the broad control and incidents of ownership retained by the settlor of a
trust made the trust income taxable to him rather than the beneficiary. As stated in
Commissioner v. Sunnen, "the crucial question remains whether the assignor retains
sufficient power and control over the assigned property or over receipt of the income
to make it reasonable to treat him as the recipient of the income for tax purposes."
21
Furthermore, "it makes no difference that such 'command' may be exercised through
specific retention of legal title or the creation of a new equitable but controlled inter-
Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946); Thomas v. Perkins, 3oi U.S. 655 (1937); Palmer v.
Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
17. This observation is supported by Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 4z-13 (1940),
in which the Court recognized that, when oil rights and fee were sold together, capital gains
treatment would be given the entire proceeds. The proceeds in that sale could be realized from
the conversion of the fee, whereas the proceeds in the other oil and gas cases could be viewed
only as a share in production and sale of a non-capital item. See the majority opinion in
Brown, 38o U.S. at 575-76.
%8. The Court here relied upon the doctrines set forth in Hanover Bank v. Commissioner,
369 U.S. 672 (:1962); Commissioner v. Korell, 339 U.S. 6"%9, 627-29 (:95o); Helvering v.
William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 249 (1941). "Sale" is to be given its ordinary
meaning in these cases, so far as it is consonant with the general purposes and structure of
the taxing law. That ordinary meaning is a transfer of property for a consideration paid or
promised to be paid, according to Iowa v. McFarland, 110 U.S. 471, 478 (1884), and William-
son v. Berry, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 495,544 (1849). The Court relied heavily on the definition of
"sale" found in state laws and in the Uniform Commercial Code. The weight of judicial
authority indicates that federal courts are not bound by the definition of sale employed by
the state and that the state definition will control only when the federal taxing act, by ex-
press language or necessary implication, makes its own operation dependent upon state law.
See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 1:0 (1932).
19. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 604 (1948); Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S.
355 (%939); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (i93o). See generally z Mertens, Law of
Federal Income Taxation §§ i8.02, 18.14 (rev. ed. %961). The Cancer Institute's lack of power
to determine the future use of the assets purchased is indicative of the extent of control re-
served by Brown in the apparent "sale." See the dissenting opinion of Pierce, J., in Clay B.
Brown, 37 T.C. at 493.
20. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
2:1. 333 U.S. 59%, 604 (:1948).
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est, or the maintenance of effective benefit through the interposition of a subservient
agency," 22 for taxation "is not so much concerned with refinements of title as it is
with actual command over the property." 23
In Brown, taxpayer retained seventy-two per cent of the income from the business,
actual control over the employees, assets, and operations of the business in his posi-
tion as manager, the right to appoint his successor, and the right to control disposition
of the business's assets.2 4 As the Tax Court concluded, his powers, both actual and
legal, after the sale were essentially the same as before, when he was president of the
business. Consequently, it seems reasonable to treat the taxpayer as the continued
owner of the sold assets and recipient of the business income for tax purposes.
The difficulty with this proposed treatment is that, in those cases where the ele-
ments of control govern the characterization of income, the factual situations general-
ly involve closer relationship between the parties than found in Brown, and the cases
are not concerned with the capital gains tax provisions. 25 The principle seems applica-
22. Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355, 357-58 (1939)-
23. Id. at 357, quoting from Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (:193o). Justice Goldberg
in dissent reasoned that the doctrines of Corliss v. Bowers should be applied to the Brown
transaction. 380 U.S. at 584-86 (dissenting opinion).
24. It should be noted that the purchase agreement, payment agreement, rental agreement,
and obligation to lease to Fortuna were not merely contemporaneous agreements, but rather
were drawn up simultaneously and were interdependent upon each other. Breach of any of
the agreements gave the seller the power to default the mortgage. 380 U.S. at 567.
It does not help to mention, as does the Court, that whatever control Brown retained
through his management contract was given up several years after the sale. This, in fact, is a
logical inconsistency, for it examines what Brown voluntarily did several years after the sale
to determine the extent of the powers and control given him by the terms of the sales agree-
ment. Although it appears that Brown has given up something by the reduction of his right
to receive the income from the mills from ioo% to 72%, his sacrifice is illusory; the proceeds
before the sale were subject to 52% corporate taxes, plus ordinary income tax upon distri-
bution, but after the sale were subject only to the maximum capital gains tax of 25%. As
noted in respondents' brief, a non-exempt purchaser would be entitled to recoup his invest-
ment through depreciation so that not all the business's income would be subject to the high
corporate taxes. Brief for Respondent, pp. 29-33, Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
The brief explains that, in a sale to a non-exempt institution using an accelerated method of
depreciation, a composite of 65 after tax cents of each dollar of income would be available to
meet the notes for the purchase price, whereas under the Brown transaction a slightly higher
72 cents is available. Id. at 31.
Viewed in this perspective, the existence of a "great treasury raid" is less apparent to this
taxpayer. Problems in this respect, however, arise when one considers that after the consum-
mation of the sale the exempt institution may yet make an allowance for depredation de-
ductible from whatever income of later operations is found to be taxable under the provisions
of §§ 50-15.
25. Cases in which retention of control governs the characterization of income generally
involve related parties, that is, transfers either among members of a family or between the
taxpayer and a controlled corporation. See, e.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940)
(controlled trust with husband as settlor and wife as beneficiary); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S.
473 (%94o) (sale by taxpayer to corporation wholly owned by him); Griffiths v. Commissioner,
308 U.S. 355 (x939) (transfer of stock to wholly owned corporation, which sold the stock and
agreed to pay proceeds over to taxpayer on installment basis); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d
398 (2d Cir. :95%), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (:1952) (sale and leaseback of certain patents and
land between husband and wife). Another difficulty is that the cases concern disallowance of
rental deductions paid by the seller to the related party. See, e.g., Stearns Magnetic Mfg. Co.
ble though: control of assets and income should determine the taxable person even
though the taxpayer seeks capital gains treatment and the relationship of the parties
in the transaction is informal but not familial. But courts have been unwilling to cut
through form to the substance of economic realities in sale and leaseback trans-
actions, 6 insisting rather that the transaction be analyzed solely from the standpoint
of the initial transfer.2 7 If, as in Brown, the transaction is characterized as a sale, all
subsequent receipts are treated as income from the sale, despite the seller's continuing
relationship to the business and its income.
A better approach might be, as the dissent suggests, to analyze the purpose of the
capital gains provisions:
"to relieve the taxpayer from . . . excessive tax burdens on gains resulting
from a conversion of capital investments, and to remove the deterrent effect
of those burdens on such conversions . . ." And this exception has always
been narrowly construed so as to protect the revenue against artful devices.28
The sale and leaseback, rather than preventing tax on bunched income from a con-
version of capital investment, permits, in part, favorable tax rates on otherwise
normal business income from operations. Further, as one commentator has observed,
sale and leaseback transactions have been upheld though they violate the object of
favorable treatment of charitable income and contravene several public policies.
29
In addition to conflicting with the purposes of the capital gains and charitable ex-
emption provisions, the sale and leaseback transaction of Brown conflicts with the
purpose of section 514, which contains the loophole permitting the transaction. Sec-
tion 514 and the congressional reports accompanying it indicate that the five-year
exception for business leases was designed to allow for genuine short term business
leases not usually associated with the sale and leaseback.30 The Court in Brown was
reluctant to dose the loophole of section 514 (b)(i) because Congress had recently
reconsidered the abuse of exempt income status and the sale and leaseback transaction
and had refused to alter the Code in accordance with the Commissioner's suggestions.
It thus appears that legislative action is the only solution to the loss of tax revenues
of the sale and leaseback transaction; the problem could be solved most simply by
eliminating section 514 (b) (1).31 G. James Frick
v. Commissioner, 2o8 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1954); Brown v. Commissioner, 18o F.2d 926 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (195o); Skemp v. Commissioner, -68 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948);
Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954). Brown differs from these cases in that the Commissioner
sought to deny the seller capital gains treatment of the sale proceeds.
26. There was a period when the courts looked through the form of the transactions to
the substance, as indicated in White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 928 (1952); W. H. Armston v. Commissioner, %88 F.zd 531 (sth Cir. 1951); Ingle
Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 569 (7 th Cir. %949); Shaffer Terminals, Inc., %6 T.C.
356 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. %952). Other cases during this period,
however, such as Skemp and Brown, supra note 25, relied upon more formalistic approaches,
and after 1950 the trend seemed more and more toward formalism as indicated by Felix and
Stearns Magnetic, supra note 25.
27. See Lanning, Tax Erosion and the "Bootstrap Sale" of a Business (pt. %), 1o8 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 623, 648 (i960).
28. Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 26o, 265 (1958), quoting in part from
Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. io3, 106 ( 932).
29. Lanning, supra note 27, at 697.
3o. S. Rep. No. 2375, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (195o); H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 8%st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950).
3%. See Comment, The Three-Party Sale and Lease-Back, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 14o, =157-58
(1963). The House Ways and Means Committee has expressed concern over the decision in
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LABOR LAW-Plant Relocation-Employer Ordered to Bargain With Union
at New Site Despite Lack of Majority Status-Garwin Corporation, 153
N.L.R.B. No. 59, 59 L.R.R.M. 1405 (1965).
The Garwin Corporation secretly discontinued its New York operations and resumed
business in Florida under its alter ego,1 S'Agaro, Inc. Charges were brought before
the National Labor Relations Board by Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Work-
ers' Union, AFL-CIO, as representative of the majority of Garwin employees. The
trial examiner found that the company had violated the National Labor Relations Act2
by discriminatorily discharging its employees, failing to notify the union of its in-
tent to relocate,3 and refusing to bargain about the relocation and its effects upon the
employees. 4 The trial examiner recommended that the company bargain with the
union on the condition that the union acquire a representative status at the new plant.,
The company and the union" filed exceptions with the National Labor Relations
Board. Upon review, the Board held, affirmed with modifications; an employer who
relocates his plant to avoid bargaining with the union must, upon request by the
union, bargain with the union at the new location without requiring it to establish
representative status.
In 1939, the Board declared that relocation to escape bargaining was an unfair
labor practice.7 The remedy ordered in such cases became standard: the company must
Brown in a joint statement by Chairman Wilbur D. Mills and the Honorable John W. Byrnes.
Rep. Mills & Rep. Bymes, Press Release, Aug. 27, 1965. The statement advised the congres-
sional staff to work with members of the Internal Revenue staff to draw up measures which
would correct the apparent abuses of the Code found in Brown. The staff was advised that
there may be a syphoning off of corporate earnings at capital gains tax rates to the share-
holders and the avoidance of taxes at the corporate level. The staff was instructed to devise
legislative proposals aimed at blocking this syphoning process either through the use of a
charitable organization or through a dummy corporation in conjunction with a charitable
organization. The product of these conferences will do much to shape inevitable legislation
in this area.
%. An NLRB order is effective against an alter ego of or successor to the original respondent.
Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100 (1942) (by implication).
2. 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3), and (5) (1964). Violations of §§
8(a)(C), (3), and (5) of the NLRA were specifically charged and found to be violated.
3. The workers returned to their jobs after a seasonal layoff to discover that the company
had dosed and moved to Florida.
4. It is firmly established that an employer must bargain with the union about the effects
of relocation. Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547 (961t), enforced per curiam, 305 F.2d
825 (3d Cir. 1962); Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. %6z (%957), enforced per curiam
sub nom. NLRB v. Mackneish, 272 F.zd 184 (6th Cir. 1959). Recent NLRB decisions suggest
that any decision to eliminate jobs is a mandatory subject for bargaining. See American Mfg.
Co., %39 N.L.R.B. 81t5 (963), enforced, 6o L.R.R.M. 2%22 (5th Cir. 1965) (subcontracting).
See also Note, Labor Law Problems in Plant Relocation, 77 Harv. L. Rev. izoo (1964).
5. The trial examiner also recommended that if the respondent remained in Florida it must
offer its employees reinstatement and reimburse them for expenses if they chose to move and
make them whole for any loss of pay from the date of relocation until they find substantially
equivalent employment. Garwin Corp., 59 L.R.R.M. 1405, 14o8 n.3 (1965).
6. The union suggested as an alternative remedy that the company be ordered to return
to New York, but this was rejected by the NLRB as punitive. Garwin Corp., supra note 5, at
14o8.
7. Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937, modified per curiam sub nom. NLRB v. Schieber,
offer reinstatement in its new plant to all employees unlawfully discharged, provide
back pay from the date of discharge to the date of offer of reinstatement at the new
plant, pay moving expenses of employees choosing to move, and bargain with the
union only if it re-establishes a majority at the new plant.'
Imposition of the standard order depended on the presence or absence of anti-union
animus or on the feasibility of employee transfer. When the great distance between
the original and the relocated plants minimized employee transfer, under the most
favorable circumstances, the Board refused to issue bargaining orders. 9 But the Board
issued orders when the new plant was located within commuting distance of the old
and the relocation was motivated by a desire to avoid bargaining with the union.10
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, reversed such an order in
Rapid Bindery, Inc.,"- stating that the order "is not proper inasmuch as the union
does not appear to represent any of the employees at the [relocated] plant."' 2
Prior to Garwin, the only departure from the standard remedy occurred in Bonnie
Lass Knitting Mills, Inc.,13 in which the Board increased the back pay liability for
an employer who refused to bargain about relocation. This liability terminated only
when the employer offered reinstatement at the old plant or the employee found sub-
stantially equivalent employment.' 4 Thus, the power to terminate the back pay lia-
bility can no longer be exercised unilaterally by the employer through an offer of re-
instatement at the new plant.'
5
Despite attempts to formulate an effective policy, the Board's inability to create an
adequate remedy for "runaway shops" became increasingly apparent.16 Even after
Bonnie Lass, the standard order placed employers who refused to bargain in only a
slightly worse position than those who bargained in good faith. In both cases, em-
ployers would have to offer reinstatement to employees in the new plant and reim-
burse them for moving expenses. Except for the back pay provisions under Bonnie
Lass, the liability of employers in both would be equal; neither would have to bar-
gain with the union in the new location unless the union could re-establish its ma-
ii6 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 194o). See also Jacob H. Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746 (1939), modified, 29
N.L.R.B. %4 (194%).
8. See, e.g., Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547, 556 (1961), enforced per curiam, 305
F.2d 825 (3 d Cir. 1962).9. See, e.g., Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 16z (%957), enforced per curiam sub
nom. NLRB v. Mackneish, 272 F.2d %84 (6th Cir. 1959); Mount Hope Finishing Co., ro6
N.L.R.B. 480 (1953), enforcement denied on other grounds, 211 F.2d 365 (4 th Cir. %954) (court
found valid economic reasons for relocation).
1o. See, e.g., Royal Optical Mfg. Co., %35 N.L.R.B. 64 (1962); California Footwear Co., %14
N.L.R.B. 765 (1955), enforced in part sub nom. NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957).
Cf. Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (%953). As there was no evidence of
union animus in Brown Truck, the NLRB did not issue a bargaining order.
%%. 127 N.L.R.B. 2%2 (196o), enforcement denied, 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. %96x). The NLRB
found union animus to be the motivation for the company's relocation, but the court rejected
this finding and refused to enforce the NLRB's order as it found that the company relocated
for economic and, therefore, lawful reasons.
12. 293 F.2d at %77.
13. -126 N.L.R.B. 1396 (196o).
14. Id. at 1398. See also Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced,
316 F.2d 846 (sth Cir. 1963).
15. As in the standard back pay order, the employees are under a duty to mitigate damages.
For an example of the standard discriminatory discharge back pay liability in a nonrelocation
case, see Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, %97-98 (194%).
%6. See Flannery, The Need for Creative Orders Under Section xo(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 69, 87-89 (1963).
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jority. Thus, an employer who relocated his plant to avoid bargaining with the union,
although not assured his goal, could take a fairly well-calculated risk. Most of his
employees would not be willing to accept reinstatement at a plant located distant from
their homes; the union would be unable to command a majority in the new plant;
and the back pay liability would not be excessive in a tight labor market because the
employee can be expected to find suitable alternative work.
In response to the inefficiency of the standard order, the Board in Garwin altered
its remedial policy. Although previous orders had been concerned primarily with
compensating injured employees, the Board in Garwin focused on the problem of
deterring employers from relocating to avoid bargaining with the union. The Board
directed the company to bargain with the union on behalf of all employees at the
new plant. If the union re-establishes its majority, normal contract bar rules would
apply to any collective bargaining contract. But if the union could not command a
majority of the employees, any contract resulting from the bargaining order would
be effective for only one year. After this one-year period, the union would be subject
to a decertification petition brought under the act.17
In the cases relied on in Garwin, broad bargaining orders were issued in response
to the employer's tactics undermining the union. The cases fall into three categories:
(:E) after the union has proved its majority status, it is undermined by the employer;1 8
(z) after the union has proved its majority status, employer delay and normal plant
turnover remove the union's majority status;19 (3) expansion of the unit after it has
elected the union destroys the union's majority status.20 If relocation is viewed as an
attempt to undermine the union majority by a geographical change, these cases sup-
port the result reached in Garwin.
In formulating the new order, the Board attempted to balance the interests of the
parties. On one hand, under the standard order the company would escape its statu-
tory duty to bargain and thus enjoy the fruits of its unfair labor practice. On the oth-
er, the Board was concerned with the statutory rights of workers employed at the re-
located plant to participate in or refrain from union activity.21 The standard remedy
requires new employees to yield their positions in favor of those unlawfully dis-
charged.2 2 In Garoin, the Florida employees owed the continuance of their jobs, and
thus their protection under the act, to the failure of the New York employees to exer-
cise their right of reinstatement.P Consequently, the Board gave less weight to the
'17. The decertification process as described in § 9(c)(I)(A) of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 453
(2935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § %59(c)(1)(A) (1964), provides for employee petition to have a
Board review of the majority status of the recognized union.
%8. Delight Bakery, Inc., %45 N.L.R.B. 893 (1964); Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1z63
(%949), modified, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 195o).
%9. Frank Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (%944); Western Aluminum of Oregon, Inc.,
144 N.L.R.B. 1191 (%963).
2o. Tishomingo County Elec. Power Ass'n, 74 N.L.R.B. 864 (1947).
2%. NLRA § 7, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1.57 (1964).
22. See, e.g., Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547, 554 (%96:), enforced per curiam, 305
P.2d 825 (3 d Cir. %962).
23. Garwin Corp., 59 L.R.R.M. at 1409 (%965).
rights of the Florida employees in its attempt to deter employer conduct inimical to
the act.
If the union works to gain support of a majority of employees, the employees will
probably benefit from union representation by better wages and working conditions.
Had the Board not issued the order, the employees may have been reluctant to or-
ganize because of the company's past anti-union animus and relocation. Working
under union protection for one year will provide the employees the opportunity to
observe unionization. Even if they later reject the union, employees will have been
apprised of their right of self-organization.
Unions, however, by virtue of their delegated authority, have the power to contract
away many employee rights. A collective bargaining contract frequently contains
provisions limiting opportunities for employee organizational activity.24 As the ex-
dusive bargaining agent for all employees, the union will be able to restrict employee
action without the authority that ensues from majority support. The Board attempted
to minimize these dangers by limiting any contract that might result from its bar-
gaining order to one year instead of the normal three-year contract bar period.
The problem of a union representing employees who have not chosen it is further
complicated when another union is competing for the support of these employees.
Although this was not a factor in Garwin, it should be considered to determine the
appropriateness of this remedy in subsequent relocation cases. An award of bargain-
ing rights in such a case would seem a denial of the employees' statutory right to self-
organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
The Board should refrain from using the bargaining order when the statutory pur-
poses of employee representation have already been accomplished.
On balance, the Board's decision appears correct. Assuming that the relocation
was primarily motivated by a desire to avoid bargaining with the union, the interests
of the Florida employees must yield to the Board's choice of an effective remedy.
However, in other cases in which stronger economic motivations for relocation are
present, the bargaining order issued in Garwin would appear to be unduly harsh.
Margery Waxman Smith
PATENTS-Ex parte Prosecution-Attempt Permitted to Recoup a Species
Within a Genus Lost in Interference-In re Taub, 348 F.2d 556, %46
U.S.P.Q. 384 (C.C.P.A. %965).
Rausser filed a parent application' disclosing only the hydrogen species of a chemical
compound. Thereafter, appellant Taub filed an application2 disclosing a genus com-
prising the hydrogen species and four halo species of the same compound. Rausser
subsequently filed a continuation application 3 disclosing the genus, and an interfer-
ence4 was declared between Rausser's continued application and appellant's applica-
24. See Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 62z (6th Cir. 1965), denying enforcement of
148 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1964); NLRB v. Gale Products, Div. of Outboard Marine Corp., 337 F.2d
390 (7th Cir. 1964), denying enforcement of 142 N.L.R.B. 1246 (1963).
%. U.S. Patent Application S.N. 673141, Rausser, filed July z, %957.
2. U.S. Patent Application S.N. 72239 o , Taub, filed March %9, 1958.
3. U.S. Patent Application S.N. 733843, Rausser, filed May 8, %958, now U.S. Patent
3%64618, issued Jan. 5, 1965.
4. Interference No. 89880, instituted Nov. 26, 1958.
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tion, the pertinent count reciting the genus. Rausser was awarded priority5 based on
the filing date of his parent application.' In subsequent ex parte prosecution,7 appellant
presented a daim8 reciting the fluoro species of the compound. The Board of Appeals
assumed all species embraced by the generic count awarded to Rausser to be prior
art and affirmed the Examiner's rejection on the ground that the count reads on the
claimed species. On appeal to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, held, re-
versed and remanded; where a party is awarded a generic count based on priority
of a single species, every species of the genus is not prior art to be considered in deter-
mining the unobviousness of other species of the genus.
An interference proceeding determines the priority of invention between parties
having applications that appear to contain common patentable subject matter.9 The
common subject matter is defined by an interference count, which is an identical
claim in each application. In applications claiming a chemical compound, such as
those of Rausser and Taub, a number of chemical species may be claimed by reciting
them in a genus.' 0 Since chemical genera do not in fact exist," however, a problem is
encountered in determining priority of a generic invention where the parties have
reduced to practice different species. The Patent Office has followed the procedure of
declaring the interference on the genus'2 and awarding the genus to the party who
shows priority of a single species within the genus.'5
5. 35 U.S.C. § ro2(g) (1964). Invention is a two step process: conception and reduction to
practice. Reduction to practice may be actual or constructive. In the case of chemical com-
pounds, actual reduction to practice is the production of the compound in the laboratory;
constructive reduction to practice is the filing of a legally sufficient patent application. He
who is first to conceive and first to reduce to practice will always be awarded priority. How-
ever, he who conceives first but reduces to practice second may still get an award of priority
if he is able to show diligence from a time prior to the other's conception. Ibid.
6. Taub v. Rausser, %45 U.S.P.Q. 497 (Bd. Pat. Intf. %964). Taub unsuccessfully attempted
to show actual reduction to practice prior to the filing date of Rausser's parent application,
which was relied on for constructive reduction to practice.
7. When an interference is declared, ex parte prosecution of the application is suspended.
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure §§ %1o3, 1o9.o2 (3 d ed. Rev. 5, July 1965) [herein-
after cited as M.P.E.P.].
8. In U.S. Patent Application S.N. 831688, Taub, filed Aug. 5, x959, a division of U.S.
Patent Application S.N. 72239o, Taub, filed March 19, 1958. However, since it is uncontested
that appellant adequately disclosed the claimed fluoro species in his earlier filed application,
the two Taub applications will hereinafter be treated as one.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1964).
io. Ex parte Markush, 1925 C.D. 126, 340 O.G. 839 (Comm'r Pat. 1925). See also M.P.E.P.
§ 7o 6.o3(y).
%%. Only species compounds exist because a particular position on any given molecule is
always occupied by some species. See Fieser & Fieser, Steroids 694 (1959).
12. M.P.E.P. § 11oi.o(j) provides that "the broadest patentable claim which is allowable
in each case should be used as the interference count...."
x3. Kyrides v. Andersen, 12% F.2d 514, 50 U.S.P.Q. 131 (C.C.P.A. 1941). Kyrides filed a
parent application disclosing the ethyl species of a chemical compound. Subsequently, Ander-
sen filed an application claiming the genus (alkyl). Kyrides filed a continuation application
disclosing only the ethyl species and claiming the alkyl genus. An interference was declared
between the Andersen application and the Kyrides continuation, the pertinent count reciting
the genus. Kyrides was awarded priority of the genus, the court stating that he was the first
to reduce to practice the invention defined in the count.
The court in Taub stated, "The problem arises from the fact that one may establish priority
In Taub, the court stated that under section :o[(g) 14 the genus defined by the inter-
ference count is not the prior invention of another applicable against appellant's
claimed fluoro species. 15 Since only the hydrogen species is prior art, the case was re-
manded to determine whether or not the fluoro species is obvious in view of the hydro-
gen species.
Taub reached a result both logical and just to appellant, but the possible injustice
that may occur on remand illustrates the fallacy of the interference procedure of
awarding the genus to the party who shows priority of a single species within the
genus.
If the Patent Office determines the fluoro species to be unobvious in view of the
hydrogen species, appellant will be awarded a claim to the fluoro species. 1 6 However,
whether appellant or Rausser is entitled to an award of priority of the fluoro species
has never been determined.' 7 Although Rausser may be entitled to the fluoro species,
appellant may be granted a claim to that species in ex parte prosecution in which
Rausser is not a party.' 8
An alternative procedure for determining priority when parties have reduced to
practice different species is to declare the interference only on species counts. If one
party be awarded priority of all species within a genus, that party would be free to
claim the entire genus. If each party won several species, each might recite them in
different genera.
Had the suggested procedure been followed, the interference that preceded Taub
would have contained five counts: hydrogen, fluoro, chloro, bromo, and iodo. Assum-
ing both parties relied on their filing dates to prove constructive reduction to prac-
tice, Rausser would have been awarded priority of the count reciting the hydrogen
species, and appellant the remaining four species. The hydrogen species would then
be prior art with respect to the remaining species. If the remaining species be found
unobvious in view of the hydrogen species, then the counts reciting the remaining
species would be patentable to the appellant.
This is almost the result in Taub, the important difference being that both appel-
for a generic claim on the basis of a showing that he was prior as to a single species." 348
F.2d at 562, 146 U.S.P.Q. at 389.
%4. The court dismissed 35 U.S.C. § 1o2(a) (1964) as possible grounds for the Board of
Appeals decision since the invention defined by the count was not publicly known or used.
15. The court reasoned that, within the term prior art, prior means before, and since the
fluoro species of Rausser (embraced by the generic count) was not reduced to practice before
appellant's, it is not prior.
i6. Rausser by showing priority of one species (hydrogen), was awarded in the interference
count reciting the genus, another species (fluoro), even though on remand that species be
found unobvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, which presumably includes Rausser him-
self.
17. Appellant moved to have a new interference declared on a count reciting the fluoro
species. The motion was denied, the Examiner stating that the fluoro species of the count of
the proposed interference is within the scope of the generic count awarded to Rausser in the
terminated interference. Presentation of this motion foreclosed any argument of estoppel by
the Patent Office. See In re Yale, 347 F.2d 995, -46 U.S.P.Q. 400 (C.C.P.A. %965); and In re
Bandel, 348 F.zd 563, 146 U.S.P.Q. 389 (C.C.P.A. %965), both decided concurrently with the
principal case.
%8. If the Patent Office determines appellant's fluoro species to be unobvious, a patent will
issue to appellant with a claim to that species. Then either appellant or Rausser might bring
a civil suit for interference under 35 U.S.C. § 291 (%964).
Another course of action the Patent Office might follow is to declare a second interference
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § %35 (%964) to determine priority of the fluoro species.
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lant and Rausser have a claim to the fluoro species' s when in all probability only one
of them is entitled to that species. David R. Murphy
PATENTS-Foreign Filing License-Commissioner Lacks Authority to Grant
Retroactive License After Issuance of Patent-Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 240 F. Supp. 150, 145 U.S.P.Q. 81 (N.D. Ohio
1965).
Plaintif' filed a series of three continuing applications,2 the last of which matured
into the patent in suit.3 Three months after filing the second application, plaintiff
requested from the Patent Office a license to file foreign applications 4 on the dis-
closed invention. Before the license was granted, plaintiff filed abroad.5 A non-retro-
active license was later granted by the Commissioner. In a subsequent infringement
suit,6 defendant successfully moved for summary judgment on the ground that plain-
tiff's foreign filing7 without a license prior to the expiration of the statutory six-month
period8 after domestic filing invalidated the patent.9 Plaintiff then obtained a retro-
active license and moved for reconsideration, alleging the new license cured the statu-
19. Rausser's claim to fluoro is in the fluoro species of the Markush genus; appellant's is
the fluoro species per se. The patentee is entitled to exclude others from maling, using, or
selling the invention under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1964). Thus, appellant and Rausser would be
entitled to exclude each other and would have to cross license to be able to practice the in-
vention. Third parties would be obliged to get licenses from both. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1964).
x. Plaintiff, Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., is the assignee of the applicant.
2. U.S. Patent Application S.N. 641714, Hoover, filed Feb. 2%, 1957; U.S. Patent Applica-
tion S.N. 777:67, Hoover, filed Oct. 8, %958 (a continuation-in-part of S.N. 64%714); U.S.
Patent Application S.N. 1453, Hoover, filed Jan. vi, 196o (a continuation-in-part of S.N.
777167).
3. U.S. Patent 2958593, Hoover, issued Nov. %, 1960.
4. Licenses to file applications abroad are required by 35 U.S.C. § 184 (%964) which pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Except when authorized by a license obtained from the Commissioner a person shall
not fie or cause or authorize to be filed in any foreign country prior to six months after
filing in the United States an application for patent .... The license may be granted
retroactively where an application has been inadvertently filed abroad and the application
does not disclose an invention within the scope of section 181 of this title.
5. Argentine Patent Application S.N. 153295, filed Jan. 22, 1959 (issued); Australian
Patent Application S.N. 45148159, fied Jan. 20, %959 (issued); Italian Patent Application
S.N. 28/71, filed Jan. 22, 1959 (issued); Japanese Patent Application S.N. 1698158, filed Jan.
24, %959 (issued); Swedish Patent Application S.N. 457159, filed Jan. 19, 1959 (issued).
6. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 240 F. Supp. 150, %44 U.S.P.Q. 272 (N.D.
Ohio 1965).
7. Although the patent in suit matured from a continuation-in-part of the second filed
application, the penalty attached to the patent, which was granted on the third application.
The defect in the second application carried over to the third application, thus preventing
avoidance of the penalty.
8. 35 U.S.C. § 184 (1964).
9. 35 U.S.C. § %85 (%964) provides in pertinent part:
[A]ny person ... shall not receive a United States patent for an invention if that person
... shall, without procuring the license prescribed in section 184 of this title, have made
... application in foreign countries for a patent .... A United States patent issued to
such person. .. shall be invalid.
tory defect. The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held, motion for
reconsideration denied; a retroactive license obtained after the issuance of a patent
is ineffective to cure a defect in the patent caused by unlicensed foreign filing prior
to the expiration of the statutory six-month period.
An applicant is required under section 184 of Title 35 of the United States Code to
obtain a license in order to file a foreign application within six months after domestic
filing on an invention made in the United States.'0 The six-month period allows the
Patent Office time to determine whether or not foreign disclosure adversely affects
national security.' The subject matter is presumed cleared for foreign filing if no
secrecy order' 2 issues within that period.' 3 Failure to comply with section c84 results
under section 185 in a bar to obtaining, or an invalidation of, the corresponding
patent.14 However, the Commissioner of Patents may grant a retroactive license when
the foreign disclosure was both inadvertent' 5 and harmless to national security.16
Statutes requiring permission by license to file abroad were first enacted before
World War 1 1,i but lacked the six-month and retroactive licensing provisions. Nev-
ertheless, to remedy problems caused by war-time failures in communication, the
Commissioner issued post-patenting retroactive licenses.' 8 The Boykin Act' 9 exempted
patents from invalidation where "the Commissioner subsequently authorized filing
of the application. . ." Although the savings provision was phrased in the past tense,
In re Lee20 held that the Commissioner had power to continue granting post-patenting
retroactive licenses. The Invention Secrecy Act of 195121 repealed the World War II
foreign filing statutes and substituted section 184, which is silent on the Commis-
sioner's power to grant such licenses 22
The Commissioner, however, continued to grant post-patenting retroactive licenses
under section E84, but recently in In re Rinker2 3 cautioned that whether or not such
a license validates an already issued but defective patent is a matter for judicial de-
termination. In a subsequent suit involving the Rinker patent,2 4 the District Court
for the District of New Jersey relied on the license obtained from the Patent Office
to deny invalidation of the patent. Similarly, the district courts for the District of
Columbia- 5 and the Northern District of Illinois2 6 upheld the Commissioner's power
io. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Coleman Instruments, Inc., 338 F.d 573, 143 U.S.P.Q.
278 (7th Cir. %964).
i. Ansell & Hamilton, Security Considerations in Filing Patent Applications Abroad,
5o A.B.A.J. 946, 948 (1964). See also Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Coleman Instruments,
Inc., supra note io.
12. Provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1964).
13. Ansell & Hamilton, supra note ii.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 185 (%964).
15. This requirement is satisfied by a swom allegation to this effect. See, e.g., papers nos.
42, 43 in plaintiff's file wrapper, U.S. Patent Application S.N. 777167, filed Oct. 8, %958.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 184 (1964).
17. Act of July 1, 1940, ch. 501, 54 Stat. 71o; Act of Aug. 21, 1941, ch. 393, 55 Stat. 657.
18. See the report on § 6 of the Boykin Act, 6o Stat. 940 (1946), H.R. Rep. No. %948, 79 th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1496 (1946).
x9. 6o Stat. 940 (1946).
20. 77 U.S.P.Q. 659 (Conm'r Pat. 1948).
21. 35 U.S.C. §§ 18%-88 (1964).
22. See H.R. Rep. No. 1o28, 82d Cong., rst Sess. (1951).
23. -145 U.S.P.Q. 156 (Comm'r Pat. 1965).
24. Englehard Indus., Inc. v. Sel-Rex Corp., 145 U.S.P.Q. 319 (D.NJ. 1965).
25. Pillsbury Co. v. Brenner, 146 U.S.P.Q. 99 (D.D.C. 1965); McCormick v. Brenner, 146
U.S.P.Q. 340 (D.D.C. 1965).
26. Blake v. Bassick Co., 146 U.S.P.Q. 157 (N.D. Ill. 1963), motion for summary judgment
denied, 146 U.S.P.Q. %6o (N.D. Ill. %965).
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to validate a patent by granting the patentee a retroactive license under section 184.
The court in the 3 M cases analyzed the language of sections 184 and 185 in the
light of the legislative history. Under the power granted it by the patent clause in the
Constitution, 7 Congress conferred on federal courts jurisdiction over patents, except
for interferences, 28 reissue patents,29 statutory disclaimers,8 0 and certificates of correc-
tion.3 1 The court recognized the Boykin Act as a further exception to federal court
jurisdiction, but found in the language and legislative history of the present provi-
sions an intent to deny the Commissioner jurisdiction to issue post-patenting retro-
active licenses.32 The court reasoned that, since section 184 refers only to applications
and not to patents,83 Congress did not extend to the Commissioner authority to issue
licenses to cure a defect in a patent; had such authority been intended, section 184
would have referred to "application or patent." Finally, the court saw section 1853
as an ab initio invalidation of the patent, which remains invalid since the Commis-
sioner is without jurisdiction over patents.
Not only is the court's statutory construction doubtful, but it begs the central ques-
tion whether or not the Commissioner has authority to issue such licenses. The word
"application" in section 184 is modified by "filed abroad";8 5 thus, the term refers to
the foreign and not the domestic application. Since it would be meaningless for that
portion of section 184 to refer to "patents.. .filed abroad," the omission of the word
"patents" does not lead to a conclusion that Congress intended to deny the Commis-
sioner power to cure defective patents by issuing retroactive licenses.
To resolve the ambiguities in sections %84 and 185, which are complicated by the
lack of legislative history, requires an examination of the purpose of the statute: to
prevent inadvertent disclosure of information detrimental to national security.36 A
foreign disclosure that breaches security is irretrievable; but any reasonable, preven-
tive statute should not impose a penalty for inadvertent disclosure of non-security
material.
The World War I statute did not distinguish between inadvertently filed foreign
applications where security was breached and those where there was no breach of
security; a license to fie abroad was required in all cases, and no retroactive savings
clause was available. However, Congress provided for such breach-versus-no-breach
distinction by ratifying in the Boykin Act the Commissioner's practice of granting
licenses where no breach of security occurred. The breach-no-breach distinction ap-
27. U.S. Const. art I, § 8.
28. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1964).
29. 35 U.S.C. §§ 25%-52 (E964).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1964).
31. 35 U.S.C. §§ 254-55 (%964).
32. See H.R. Rep. No. %o28, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
33. 2 4 0 F. Supp. at 155 n.4 (sic], %45 U.S.P.Q. at 84 n.3.
34. 35 U.S.C. § 185 (1964) in pertinent part states, "A United States patent issued to such
person... shall be invalid."
35. "The license may be granted retroactively where an application has been inadvertentlyfiled abroad... ." 35 U.S.C. § 184 (1964). [Emphasis added.] See Blake v. Bassick Co., 146
U.S.P.Q. 157, %6o (N.D. Ill. 1963).
36. See the House Report on the Invention Secrecy Act, H.R. Rep. No. %o28, 82d Cong.,
ist Sess. (1951).
plying under the Boykin Act to both patents and applications was expanded from mere
ratification of the past grant by the Commissioner to a continuing authority in In
re Lee. Although in the Invention Secrecy Act the absolute necessity for a license was
rejected in favor of the six-month presumption provision, either type of provision
indicates a continuance of the basic policy distinction. Upon the implied termination
of the Boykin Act,3 7 the statutory reference to patents was dropped without
any change in rationale or basic policy. The omission of the reference to patents ap-
parently did not reflect an intention to change prior statutory or case law. Thus, the
authority granted the Commissioner under the Boykin Act and made continuous by
In re Lee should be considered to still exist.
Invalidating the patent in the 3M case is particularly harsh since the patentee did
not violate the purpose of the statute.a5 Validating such a patent would not conflict
with the purpose of the statute to preserve national security and would be more equi-
table than invalidation on a technical ground unrelated to the substantive quid pro
quo of the patent grant.
Stanley Green
PATENTS-Statutory Bars-References Published Prior To One Year Before
Filing Date Available For Obviousness Under Section 102(b)-In re Fos-
ter, 343 F.2d 98o,1c45 U.S.P.Q. 166 (C.C.P.A. %965), petition for cert. filed,
34 U.S.L. Week 3075 (U.S. Aug. 14, 1965) (No. 347)-
Claims in appellant's patent application1 were rejected by the Patent Office as unpat-
entable because a printed publication partially describing the invention appeared more
than one year prior to the filing date of the application. The Patent Office Board of
Appeals affirmed the rejection. On appeal to the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals, appellant questioned the availability of the publication as a reference, relying
for its removal on a previously submitted affidavit2 that showed a date of invention
prior to the date of publication. The Patent Office contended that appellant was barred
from challenging the availability of the publication by the statutory time bar pro-
visions of section 1o2(b) of the 1952 Patent Act.' Relying on In re Palmquist,4 ap-
37. The World War II statutes, by their own terms were to expire at the war's end; the
Invention Secrecy Act of 195%, passed before the war was technically over, necessitated ex-
press repeal. 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (%964). Section 6 of the Boykin Act, 6o Stat. 940 (%946),
being an exception to the World War II statutes, 54 Stat. 710 (%940), 55 Stat. 657 (%941),
thereby ceased being effective although never expressly repealed.
38. The grant of a license by the Commissioner positively establishes the lack of breach of
security.
%. U.S. Patent Application S.N. 6o544o, Poster, filed Aug. 21, %956.
2. Patent Office Rules of Practice, Rule 131, 37 C.F.R. § %.131 (x964), states in pertinent
part:
When any claim of an application is rejected on reference ... to a printed publication,
and the applicant shall make oath to facts showing a completion of the invention in this
country. . . before the date of the printed publication, then the ... publication cited
shall not bar the grant of a patent to the applicant, unless the date of such ... printed
publication be more than one year prior to the date on which the application was filed
in this country.
[Emphasis added.]
3. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (%964) states in pertinent part that a person shall be entitled to a
patent unless-
the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign coun-
try... or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of
the application for patent in the United States.
4. 319 F.2d 547, 138 U.S.P.Q. 234 (C.C.P.A. 1963), noted, 32 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 656 (1964).
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pellant argued that the statutory time bar applies only to references that describe
completely the invention, and not to references that merely render an invention ob-
vious. Held, affirmed; a publication appearing more than one year before the filing
date of an application for patent is available to support a rejection for obviousness
under section 1o2(b).
Since %839, an applicant has been required by the patent statutes to file for patent
within a limited time after the invention becomes public. The Patent Act of 18395
provided that public use or sale of the invention two years prior to application barred
the patent. The statutes were amended in 1897 to include disclosure in a publication. 6
Section 102(b) requires that the patent application be filed within one year after this
publication. This limitation is designed to promote prompt filing so that the grant of
the patent monopoly does not remove that which has long been in the public domain.7
Prior to the enactment of section 1o3,8 there was no statutory distinction between
references in publications showing all or only part of an invention.9 Any publication
that rendered an invention unpatentable-either because it completely described the
invention or partially described it so that the invention became obvious to a man of
ordinary skill in the art-if available to the public for the prescribed period would
be astatutory timebar.10 Under section 102 (a),11 a reference that completely describes
the invention is a basis for rejection; 12 section 1o3 authorizes rejections based on ref-
erences that only render the claimed invention "obvious" at the time it was made.
Notwithstanding the statutory distinction between complete and partially disclosing
references, courts have recognized that section 1o3 was not enacted to modify that
5. Act of 1839, ch. 88, § 7,5 Stat. 354.
6. Rev. Stat. § 4886 (%875), as amended by Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 39%, § 1, 29 Stat. 692.
7. Andrews v. Hovey, 123 U.S. 267 (1887), affirmance upheld on rehearing, %24 U.S. 694
(x888); Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322 (1858).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964) states in part:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or de-
scribed as set forth in section 1o2 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. [Emphasis added.]
9. See Morris v. McMillin, =12 U.S. 244 (1884); Hotchiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (i% How.)
248 (1850).
1o. In re Wenzel, 88 F.2d 501, 33 U.S.P.Q. 30 (C.C.P.A. 1937). Even after the 1952 act was
passed, but before Palmquist, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed an Examiner's
rejection based on 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1964) in view of a printed publication that rendered
the claims obvious. In re Ruscetta, 255 F.2d 687, 1=8 U.S.P.Q. ox. (C.C.P.A. 1958). See also
In re Stempel, 241 F.2d 755, 760, 113 U.S.P.Q. 77, 81 (C.C.P.A. :957).
1%. 35 U.S.C. § %o2(a) (1964) states in part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless--(a) the invention was known or used by
others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent ....
12. 35 U.S.C. § 1z(a) (1964) is somewhat broader than requiring a reference to disclose
oo% of the claimed invention since the reference may show less than the entire invention,
yet anticipate it: that is, the invention claimed is anticipated in the sense of being disclosed
sufficiently to put one of ordinary skill in the art "in possession" of the claimed invention.
In re Le Grice, 301 F.2d 929, %33 U.S.P.Q. 365 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
aspect of pre-existing statutory law, but to "codify"' 3 prior case law that made "ob-
viousness" a test of patentability.' 4 However, the language of section 1o3 does not
in haec verba refer to statutory time bars; rather, its express statement that obvious-
ness is to be determined "at the time the invention was made" appears to negate the
operation of a bar where rejection is based on a combination of partially disclosing
references. In Palmquist, that phrase was relied on to remove the publication from
any consideration of whether a time bar existed since, at the time the invention was
made, the reference was not yet in existence.
The court in Foster reasoned that the phrase "at the time the invention was made"
only evidenced a congressional intent to prevent the use of hindsight to determine
obviousness. Although a reference may not be used to determine obviousness under
section 1o3, it is pertinent in determining the existence of a statutory time bar under
section o2(b). Further, the court continued, a contrary holding would permit an in-
ventor to sleep on his rights after his invention had become obvious to the public;
this result would conflict with patent policy that what is in the public domain should
remain there.'5 The Palmquist court erred in treating the case as one primarily involv-
ing obviousness under section 1o3, rather than "loss of right to a patent" under sec-
tion 1o2 (b).
The dissent in Foster charged the majority with legislating by giving the statutory
bar effect of section 102(b) to an obviousness reference published after the date of
invention. The phrases "the invention was ... described" in section 102(b) and "at
the time the invention was made" in section %o3 are unambiguous; the majority's
resort to congressional intent was therefore unwarranted.
The contention that the phrase "the invention was described" is unambiguous seems
unfounded. The same phrase appeared in the statute' 6 preceding the 1952 Act and was
construed to include partially disclosing references that would make the invention
obvious, as well as those references completely disclosing the claimed invention.17
Since there is no evidence that Congress intended to change that construction, it is
proper to read obviousness into section 102(b) by construing "described" to mean,
%3. The reviser's note to 35 U.S.C. § %03 (1964) states in part:
There is no provision corresponding to the first sentence [of § 1o3] explicitly stated in
the present statutes, but the refusal of patents by the Patent Office, and the holding of
patents invalid by the courts, on the ground of lack of invention or lack of patentable
novelty has been followed since at least as early as 1850.
Federico, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1o3, at 715 (%954). This statement has been adopted by the courts as
a correct interpretation of legislative intent. R. M. Palmer Co. v. Luden's, Inc., 236 F.2d 496,
%11 U.S.P.Q. i (3 d Cir. 1956); Stanley Works v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d 846, 97 U.S.P.Q.
189 (3 d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 8%8, 99 U.S.P.Q. 491 (1953); Bros, Inc. v. Browning Mfg.
Co., 317 F.zd 413, 137 U.S.P.Q. 624 (8th Cir. 1963).
14. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (ii How.) 248 (%85o).
15. An invention does not become in the public domain until the lapse of one year after
its non-patent disclosure. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (%964).
16. Rev. Stat. § 4886 (%875), as amended by Act of Aug. 5, 19 3 9 , ch. 450, § 1,53 Stat. %2%2,
stating in part:
Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof ... not
... described in any printed publication in this or any foreign country, before his in-
vention or discovery thereof, or more than one year prior to his application... may
obtain a patent therefor.
17. In re Wenzel, 88 F.2d 50%, 33 U.S.P.Q. 301 (C.C.P.A. 1937); Ex parte Austin, 72
U.S.P.Q. 384 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. %946).
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in effect, substantially described. A similar interpretation has been given' 8 the term
"described" in section 1o2(e), 1' thus permitting patents that only partially disclose
a claimed invention to become available as of their filing date for obviousness rejec-
tions under section 103. Although the subsection (e) interpretation of the word "de-
scribed" does not control its interpretation in subsection (1), it does, at least, show
that the Foster interpretation is not unique.
The dissent argued that two areas of the present law illustrate that, contrary to the
majority view, there is no universal policy against allowing a patent to issue on an
invention that has become obvious to the public more than one year before the filing
date. First, co-pending applications made available as references as of their filing date
by section %o2(e) can be removed by an affidavit proving an invention date prior to
the filing date of the application for patent, even if the filing date is more than one
year prior to applicant's filing date. 20 The conclusion that this disproves the majority's
universal policy is valid only if the distinction between actual and constructive knowl-
edge of a reference is overlooked. Co-pending applications are kept secret 2' from the
public until they issue as patents, so that an inventor's knowledge of the disclosure of
a patent that was co-pending with his application can only be constructive as of the
filing date of the patent. By allowing an inventor to prove an invention date of more
than one year prior to his filing date and earlier than the filing date of the secret co-
pending application, the policy of leaving in the public domain what was already
there is not violated.
The second area said to show no universal policy is that section 102(b) does not
include loss of right to patent by the public's mere knowledge of the invention for
more than one year prior to the filing date for patent. Section ioz(b) lists four pos-
sibilities that may give rise to a loss of right to a patent: if the invention, for more
than one year prior to the filing date was (i) patented, or (2) described in a printed
publication, or (3) in public use, or (4) on sale. Unlike section oz(a), public knowl-
edge is not listed as creating a bar. The dissent, however, fails to explain how public
knowledge of an invention can be proved without introducing evidence of one or more
of the four possibilities included in section 1io2(b). As an evidentiary matter, prior
public2 knowledge sufficient to preclude a patent can generally be proved only by the
%8. In re Schoenewaldt, 343 F.2d ooo, 145 U.S.P.Q. 289 (C.C.P.A. 1965). The Supreme
Court has recently reviewed the Schoenwaldt issue in Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 34
U.S.L. Week 4057 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1965).
19. 35 U.S.C. § 2oz(e) (%964) states that a person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another
filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent.
20. This situation occurred in both Palmquist and in In re Schoenewaldt, 343 F.zd 2ooo, 145
U.S.P.Q. 289 (C.C.P.A. 1965). Thus, the words "the date" in the last clause of Rule %31, 37
C.F.R. § %.%31 (1964), referring to when patents may become statutory bars, are correctly
construed to mean the date of issuance rather than the filing date.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1964).
22. The word "known" in 35 U.S.C. § 02o(a) (%964) means "public" knowledge. Pennock
v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829).
existence of at least one of the four possibilities in section 2o(b).2 3 Therefore, the
omission of "known" in section io2(b) does not, as a practical matter, militate against
the general policy foreclosing the issuance of patents on inventions that have been
obvious to the public more than one year prior to the filing date.
The Foster court failed to make dear whether section 2o(b) simply makes ref-
erences published prior to one year before the filing date available as references under
section io3, or whether section 102(b) considered alone creates the loss of right to
patent in obviousness situations.24 The former construction may seem proper because
only section 1o3 expressly uses the word "obvious." Section 1o3, however, contains a
specific time reference as to availability-the time the invention was made-thus
making this construction strained. On the other hand, by adopting the construction
that section 102(b) includes obviousness within the word "describes," resort to sec-
tion 103 is unnecessary. To arrive at this construction, however, a judge-made cate-
gory of obviousness, preserving the pre-1952 case law, is created within section 2o(b).25
In re Folkers26 is an example of the availability aspect of Foster. There, appellant
conceded the claimed invention would be obvious if the reference were available, and
it was unnecessary to invoke the judicial category of obviousness. 27 A second recent
case, In re Hassler,2 8 involved both the threshold question of availability and the sub-
sequent question of obviousness within the new meaning of section 1o2(b). Thus,
the court dearly indicates that Foster does not import section to3 into section 102(b)
or vice-versa.
The judge-made category of obviousness within section io2(b) permits courts to
formulate policy without being limited by precedents exclusively concerned with
hindsight problems of section io3. Section 102(b) protects the public, not the inven-
tor; thus, the protection afforded an inventor by a "no-hindsight" policy is imma-
terial in cases involving time-bars. Since Foster does not confuse the policies under-
lying sections io3 and 102(b), there is no warrant to expect a time-bar to arise where
a pending application filed more than one year prior to another application renders
the latter obvious. Only by reading section 1o2(e) as interpreted with reference to
section io3, as in In re Harry,29 together with section 1o2(b) could such a bar arise.
23. To be sufficient knowledge, it must be of a complete invention, Coffin v. Ogden, 85
U.S. (%8 Wall.) 120, 124 (1873), or of such character as would enable a person skilled in the
art to make or use the invention. Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. Janin, 278 Fed. 454
(2d Cir. 1921). Testimony of knowledge of an invention passed only by means of the memories
of persons to other persons was held not accessible to the public. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S.(1o How.) 477 (1850). If proof is of knowledge of an unpublished manuscript, it must be
sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to reduce the invention to practice. In re Borst, 345
F.2d 851, 145 U.S.P.Q. 544 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
24. The court said that loss of right to a patent is an issue with which § 1o3 per se has
nothing whatsoever to do. Also, the court said that the rejection "unpatentable over" permits
the court to consider both 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and io3 (1964). The court did not state that
its rejection was based on § 1o2(b) considered without reference to § 103. 343 F.zd at 99o,
145 U.S.P.Q. at %74-75.
25. Nothing in the statute limits obviousness exclusively to 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964). "Obvi-
ousness" as a judge-made category has been used in double patenting situations. In re Robe-
son, 331 F.2d 61o, 14% U.S.P.Q. 485 (C.C.P.A. 1964); In re Zickendraht, 319 F.2d 225, 138
U.S.P.Q. 22 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
26. 344 F.2d 967, 145 U.S.P.Q. 426 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
27. The interesting result was to affirm a 35 U.S.C. § 103 (%964) rejection without resort
to § 103.
z8. 347 F.2d 911, 146 U.S.P.Q. 167 (C.C.P.A. %965).
29. 333 F.zd 920, 142 U.S.P.Q. 164 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
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Such a fusion is improper since the policy of a statutory time-bar is predicated on
public knowledge, whereas availability as of the filing date is based on constructive
knowledge. Thus, courts may implement these differing policies when construing
obviousness within section o2(b) without being hampered by the obviousness pre-
cedents of section 1o3.
Since the Foster approach creates a separate judicial category of obviousness within
section 102(b), it does not change the time for determining obviousness under sec-
tion 103. So long as the cautionary wordso against the use of hindsight of the Foster
court are adhered to in future cases, and to the extent the underlying policy of statu-
tory time-bar applies in obviousness situations, the Foster result is a desirable return
to pre-Palmquist law.
Michael Joe Myers
30. The Foster court stated,
We wish to make it dear that this ruling is predicated on our construction of section
102(b) and has no effect on the statements in Palmquist respecting the determination of
obviousness under section 1o3 when a statutory time-bar is not involved. The existence
of unobviousness under that section, as a necessary prerequisite to patentability, we
reiterate, must be determined as of "the time the invention was made" without utilizing
after-acquired knowledge.
343 F.znd at 99 o, %45 U.S.P.Q. at %74.
